Background: A Civil Servant Under Political Control
Mikael Kaiser is head of building permits (bygglovschef) — a post classified as a neutral civil-servant role but which, in practice, carries political weight. A head of building permits has the power to approve or deny construction projects, which directly shapes the development of a town or municipality and therefore also the economic interests of property owners, developers and politicians.
The investigation focuses on a simple but powerful pattern: Mikael Kaiser has been shuttled between Kalmar Municipality and Mörbylånga Municipality — both under Social Democratic control. This movement is not an example of normal professional development; it is an example of how (S)-controlled municipalities use civil servants as loyal tools.
The Shuttling Pattern
Observation
Mikael Kaiser has been shuttled between Kalmar and Mörbylånga Municipality, two Social Democrat-controlled municipalities. This reveals a pattern of political civil-servant appointments without objective justification.
What is "shuttling"?
Shuttling is a practice in which a civil servant is placed in a post in one municipality, then moved to the same or a similar post in another, often without transparency about why. The Swedish term "runtflyttning" echoes the English "revolving door" — a constant rotation that serves the politicians who steer it.
Shuttling is not the same as normal career development, in which a civil servant applies for a new job and is selected through open recruitment. Shuttling means a civil servant is "conducted" between posts in a way that looks like natural career progression but is in fact a form of political control.
Why are civil servants shuttled?
Civil servants are shuttled for several reasons:
- Political loyalty: A civil servant who has proven "loyal" to a political party receives promotions and new opportunities
- Problem-solving: A civil servant who did something politicians did not like can be "sent away" by being moved to another municipality
- Network-building: Politicians use civil servants to extend their network into other municipalities
- Control of key functions: A politician can ensure that an important position (such as head of building permits) is filled by someone they can control
Mikael Kaiser and the Importance of Building Permits
The head of building permits is a key position in a municipality. The decision to grant or deny a permit has enormous impact on:
- Urban development: What type of buildings and businesses appear in the municipality
- Economic interests: Which property owners and developers can realise their projects
- Environment and traffic: The head of building permits rules on environmental impact and traffic effects
- Democratic control: If the head of building permits is politically controlled, a majority can effectively veto opposition projects
The Building Permit as an Instrument of Power
In a municipality where a political group (such as (S) in Kalmar) holds power, the permits process can be used to:
- Favour its own projects: Projects backed by (S) receive swift decisions; opposition projects drag on
- Block rival projects: A loyal head of building permits can find technical defects to deny permits for projects (S) does not like
- Shape the economy: By granting permits to some developers and denying others, politicians can determine which market actors succeed
Kalmar and Mörbylånga: Social Democratic Networks
Both Kalmar and Mörbylånga (or at least the political majority in each) are under Social Democratic control. This geographical proximity and party affiliation cause (S) politicians to form networks naturally between the two municipalities.
Mikael Kaiser is part of that network. By being shuttled between the two municipalities he becomes a link in a larger network that secures (S) control over important functions.
Revolving Door Between Municipalities
The investigation identifies a broader pattern of civil servants shuttled between (S)-controlled municipalities:
- Malin Almqvist: Another civil servant shuttled between Kalmar and Växjö
- Other examples: Potentially many more civil servants follow the same pattern
This shows that the shuttling is not an isolated case but a systematic pattern. There is a network of (S)-controlled municipalities that treats civil servants as resources for achieving party-political goals.
Consequences for the Rule of Law
The consequences of political control over the head of building permits are serious:
For citizens
- Reduced certainty: A citizen cannot trust that a permit decision is made on objective grounds
- Economic uncertainty: A property owner wanting to build does not know whether their project is judged on quality or on political acquaintances
- Corruption: A politicised civil servant can create situations where political loyalty is needed to obtain a permit
For democracy
- Erosion of impartial administration: A foundation of the rule of law is that civil servants are impartial
- Partialisation of the state: When civil servants become political tools, the state becomes an extension of the party rather than a neutral instrument
- Eroded voter trust: Voters who see the system is politically controlled lose confidence in institutions
For the city
- Inefficient urban planning: Permits are granted or denied on the basis of politics, not urban development or environmental considerations
- Parallel networks: Developers and property owners outside the (S) network find their projects blocked
- Brain drain: Ambitious people leave municipalities where the system is corrupted
The Pattern of the Revolving Door
Mikael Kaiser's shuttling is not unique. It follows a broader pattern in how (S)-controlled municipalities use civil servants:
Elements of the pattern
- Recruitment: A civil servant of the "right" kind — loyal, flexible, part of the network — is placed in a key position
- Testing: The civil servant is tested by being given small political assignments that are not entirely transparent
- Promotion: If the civil servant "fits" the network, they are promoted or moved to a more important position
- Rotation: The civil servant is shuttled between municipalities, creating a network of loyal civil servants spread across several organisations
- Control: The shuttled civil servants form a network that secures (S) control over important functions
Comparison with Malin Almqvist
Another civil servant, Malin Almqvist, was shuttled between Kalmar and Växjö — two other (S)-controlled municipalities. This pattern is identical to Mikael Kaiser's movement between Kalmar and Mörbylånga.
The existence of at least two examples (Kaiser and Almqvist) shows that this is not a random selection but a systematic pattern.
Legal Possibilities and Limitations
It is technically legal for a municipality to employ a civil servant and later for another municipality to employ the same person. There is no law that prohibits shuttling.
But shuttling reveals another problem: the absence of sufficient transparency and scrutiny in many municipal recruitments.
Weak recruitment processes
- Internal recruitment: Many municipalities use internal networks to recruit rather than open competitions
- No scrutiny: There is no external oversight of recruitment decisions
- Hidden political steering: Politicians can influence the recruitment process without it becoming transparent
Conclusion of the Investigation
Result
Mikael Kaiser represents a systemic pattern of shuttling civil servants between (S)-controlled municipalities. In his role as head of building permits he can potentially be used to pursue political goals rather than to make neutral permit decisions. The practice undermines the rule of law in the permits process and testifies to the erosion of a neutral public administration.
The problem is not necessarily Mikael Kaiser himself, but the system that enables this kind of political civil-servant appointment without transparency or scrutiny.
To address this, what is needed is:
- Transparent recruitment processes: All civil-servant recruitments above a given level must be open competitions
- External scrutiny: An independent ombudsman or auditor should review civil-servant recruitments
- Rotation limits: Civil servants should not be shuttled between municipalities without going through a new open competition
- Scepticism about networks: Politicians should not be able to use civil servants as tools for party-political ends
- Stronger whistleblower protection: Civil servants who expose political control of recruitments must be protected